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Abstract 
The anthropological study of citizenship enables an understanding of restitutive and 
redistributive reforms in the post-transitional context of South Africa. In its earlier, state-
derived form, citizenship’s situated and contingent character, its use of pre-existing 
modes of identification as templates, and its ethnic differentiation which expresses ‘class’ 
distinctions while also masking them, reveal that no single democratic vision can easily 
encompass all of those who would belong in a new society. In its later market-oriented 
form, citizenship becomes more individuated, with discourses stressing enterprise, 
responsibility and the need to earn rights. ‘Neoliberal governmentality’ has been used,to 
describe  the switch from state- to market-driven arrangements, but is inadequate to do 
so since it overlooks the extent to which state and market intermesh and are tightly 
interwoven, with apparently purely market-oriented initiatives reliant on extensive state 
intervention both for design and implementation. In societies undergoing rapid 
transition, even though new policies and social forces have come into play and people 
have responded to these in new ways, this novelty is mitigated and mediated through 
older social forms, attitudes and approaches, which have left their imprint upon both 
formal institutions and on the expectations and responses of those who ‘receive’ those 
institutions’ interventions. The paper calls for a view of citizenship which merges 
elements - state and market - that might at first sight seem contradictory: and which both 
acknowledges the power of wider frameworks and recognizes the ability of ordinary 
actors on the ground to respond to and sometimes resist these.  
 
 
Restitutive and redistributive land reforms in a post-transitional context such as that of 
South Africa can be usefully analysed via anthropological insights on citizenship. First, 
anthropology has demonstrated that citizenship is processual, and has a situated and 
contingent character, rather than embodying a static set of juridical rights and associated 
duties. Second, especially in settings where full rights were previously denied, newly-
emerging citizenship is often modeled on pre-existing groupings or modes of 
identification which provide templates for that which is newly to be endowed or restored. 
(The struggle against exclusion itself provides templates of this kind.)  Citizenship is 
aspirational, providing visions of what a future social order might look like, and of how 
political belonging and participation within that order ought to be structured. The end of 
apartheid brought the promise of social justice for all, in which previous wrongs would 
be set right, and those previously excluded from the body politic would be restored to 
membership of it. The state-led return or redistribution of land was predicted, and 
planned, to play an important role here, as both means and measure of belonging. 
Inevitably, however, conflicting views about land rights and entitlements revealed 
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differentiated and unequal bases for, practices of and ideas about belonging. Harking 
back to apartheid’s earlier categorizations, differentiated discourse of belonging took an 
ethnic form, revealing that no single democratic vision was easily able to encompass all 
of those who aspired to belong in the new society. 
 
However differentiated, such visions of newly-granted citizenship drew on a vision of 
society deriving its force from an era during which the state had played a major role. 
Belying this, a new, more market-oriented vision was acquiring force around the turn of 
the century. The importance of individual enterprise and of people’s responsibility for 
their own wellbeing and livelihood began to be emphasised. A generalized social and 
cultural ‘pressure’ was emerging, with the aid of but not solely determined by the 
government, in which only those who fulfil their responsibilities would be entitled to the 
rights of the citizen, and in which such rights would not necessarily be guaranteed by the 
state (Chipkin, 2003). In the case discussed here, this new vision of citizenship was 
accompanied by the return of racial categories: black to denote dependency and white to 
denote self-sufficiency.  
 
A similar change in citizenship discourse has been in evidence globally. Following post-
war welfarist regimes in Europe, which had expanded the rights of citizenship to cover 
those formerly dispossessed, Thatcherite reforms attempted to exclude them anew by 
connecting the awarding of rights to the fulfilling of responsibilities (Kymlicka and 
Norman, 1994). This emphasis accompanied the rise of the new right, the defeat of social 
democratic forms of government, and the emergence of a neo-liberal agenda. 
Government was outsourced, and attempts were made to persuade people to carry the 
responsibility for themselves and their actions rather than relying on the state.  
 
Understanding the restoring of citizenship through land reform thus requires a discussion 
of the salience of the concept ‘neoliberal governmentality’ (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). 
This concept, while offering valuable insights, proposes an overdetermined and 
monolithic vision of citizenship in its marketized form. Critical analyses of the political 
culture of neoliberalism, of the kind many anthropologists have engaged in, tend to 
overlook the part played by earlier, more state-derived visions of citizenship. The 
historical traces left by these interventions affect the shape of newer ones. State and 
market intermesh and are tightly interwoven, with apparently market-oriented initiatives 
reliant on extensive state intervention for both design and implementation. In societies 
undergoing rapid transition, even though new policies and social forces have come into 
play, and people have responded to these in new ways, this novelty is mitigated and 
mediated through older social forms, attitudes and approaches, which have left their 
imprint both upon formal institutions and upon the expectations and responses of those 
who ‘receive’ those institutions’ interventions.  
 
This paper explores the power of both state and market frameworks, and simultaneously 
recognizes people’s ability to respond to, mediate, and resist these. Given that political 
actors within the new nation are undoubtedly influenced by (confusingly overlapping) 
ideologies of both state and market, such responses are not necessarily borne out of a 
heroic refusal to kowtow to initiatives ‘from above’. Nor, conversely, are they signs of 
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the populace having simply internalized a neoliberal regime of self-discipline, or being 
unwitting victims of ‘cultural citizenship’ (Ong, 1996; 2003); they may instead be 
acquiesced to with an eye to the practical realities of survival.  
 
To understand land and citizenship in South Africa, I thus propose a many-layered 
discursive frame which merges apparently contradictory elements.  
 
Citizenship and the restoring of land 
 
Citizenship, as anthropologists have emphasized, is processual, contextual, contingent 
and changing (Cornwell, Robins and von Lieres, 2011), and is often experienced through, 
or mediated by, other forms of identification. Proto-citizens may find themselves linked 
to the nation/state, but indirectly so; for example through allegiance to tribal leaders, 
religious affiliation or kinship loyalties (Longva, 2000; Joseph, 2000).  
 
In South Africa, emerging citizenship discourses made use of existing models as 
precedent. As in other settings of transition where people strive to overcome oppressive 
regimes, the struggle movement here served to extend ideas of citizenship to those 
previously excluded, by uniting the populace (for a comparative case see Lomnitz, 
1999).
1
 Citizenship was bound to be inclusionary, liberatory and egalitarian in character, 
precisely because of the nature of the exclusionary and repressive regime against which 
the struggle had been fought. If the fight for freedom set the terms of reference, land 
provided an obvious model for national belonging. The intention to restore land to its 
former occupiers would reinstate basic civil liberties which had been removed, or denied, 
in the past (Ramutsindela, 1998). The unequal distribution of land had signaled earlier 
injustice as well as being a material result of it, and its restoring stood for the kinds of 
rights which South African blacks felt they ought to have enjoyed by virtue of their 




Such unity later fragmented when it became clear that the liberation elite would be the 
primary beneficiary of citizenship benefits, leading in turn to challenges and contestations 
by the excluded majority who resented their reliance on patronage for their access to what 
ought to have been theirs by right (Adam et al, 1998; see Lomnitz, 1999 for the case of 
Mexico). What had appeared as a solidaristic vision of restored rights at the moment of 
the first democratic elections, turned out to be constituted out of distinct pathways 
towards land-based citizenship. In other words, it was not a homogenous, or uniformly 
deprived, population to which citizenship would be restored by the state programme of 
land reform, but rather a stratified and differentiated one.  Some of the intended 
                                                 
1
 Although there are numerous differences between Mexico, which gained its 
independence from Spain in 1821, and South Africa which liberated itself from what the 
ANC called ‘internal colonialism’ in 1994, Mexico’s general citizenship narrative, 
progressing from liberation unity to post-liberation disillusion, is strikingly similar. 
2
 Land and rights became indissolubly connected in the public mind as a result of clashes 
between the apartheid state and the people whose property, land and citizenship rights it 
was threatening to destroy (Delius 1996; Seekings 2000; von Kessel 2000). 
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beneficiaries of the land reform programme were former title-holding property owners 
while others belonged to the category of landless people, mostly living on state- or white-
owned land, that had previously derisively referred to as ‘squatters’.  (The title-
holder/squatter division has tended to be represented more in ethnic than in class terms, 
as the case below demonstrates.) Both were left landless in the apartheid era, but the 
latter had never enjoyed property rights even before it.  Although seen by some as more 
‘truly landless’, and hence more deserving of the benefits of land reform (Lahiff 2000), 
members of this squatter group have been typified by others, especially policy makers, as 
less likely to use the land productively and thus as being unworthy beneficiaries of the 
programme – or at least as requiring, themselves, to be ‘reformed’.  
 
In the emerging narrative of South African citizenship, it was thus not only the elements 
of the struggle, and the land struggled-for, that set the terms of reference. A further 
important aspect concerned the fate of ethnic or race-based differentiation. Political 
leaders in the liberation struggle had proposed its total eradication. The aim was to do 
away with it in all its forms: with the enforced boundaries between language/cultural 
groups which had formed part of South Africa’s infamous policy of ‘homelands’, the 
division that had split urban-dwellers enjoying modern rights from those subject to the 
power of chiefs (Mamdani, 1996), and – most important - racially-based inequality itself 
(Marks, 1994). What was little anticipated was the extent to which contestations over 
land might see the reassertion rather than the elimination of such differences. 
 
The differentiated forms of land occupancy were certainly recognized in land reform 
policy. Several branches of the land reform program - restitution, redistribution and 
tenure reform – were designed in recognition of these differences. Restitution would 
concentrate on returning land to titled landowners who had forcibly lost their property 
during the apartheid era as a result of forced removals.  Controversially, the Restitution 
Act of 1994 was phrased so as to render more far-reaching claims, dating from before 
1913, illegitimate.  Redistribution would allow for those Africans with no previous 
formal claims on landed property to group together and purchase farms with the aid of a 
government grant.  Tenure reform would protect the rights of those residing on land but 
depending on others - chiefs (in the homelands) or white farmers (outside of them) - for 
their occupation of it.   
 
Despite this differentiated framework, restitution formed the moral cornerstone of land 
reform in the public mind. It enabled a loosely-defined and inclusive vision whereby land 
(and citizenship) rights previously alienated would be restored. It initially embraced the 
whole terrain of landlessness, only later coming to be pitted against the redistributive 
approaches when these started to be viewed, by land and human rights activists, as the 
best way of transferring significant amounts of formerly white-owned land to the 
‘historically oppressed’ (Lahiff, 2001). From early on, however, these different aspects 
blurred.  Loopholes became evident, as aspirant farmers with no former basis on the land 
attempted to prove spurious connections to it through restitution, while others with a 
genuine sense of entitlement recognized the difficulties of verifying their claims, and 
attempted to benefit from redistribution instead.   
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This blurring of policy-created boundaries was not the only modification of the land 
reform program as it came to be tested in practice. There was also a gradual but 
inexorable shift from a language of rights, commensurate with the welfarist-oriented 
vision of citizenship, to one of private ownership, market-oriented economic viability 
and the need to fulfil responsibilities (see Kymlikca and Norman, 1994). The former 
emphasis had owed much to the presence of human rights lawyers and NGO activists 
who played a key role in the program’s design. The latter reflected an increasingly 
predominant line of argument, adopted by the government after the second democratic 
elections in 1999, which foregrounded the economic benefits to be gained from secure 
ownership, and the economically viable use, of property. While the two approaches were 
linked in the early years of the land reform program, the government’s subsequent shift 
towards more explicitly neoliberal economic policies decoupled the rights-based 
approach from the market-based/economic one, favouring the latter. Attempts to foster a 
land-owning, middle-class black farming constituency became paramount, eclipsing the 
previous emphasis on safeguarding the basic residence rights and welfare of the rural 
poor through land redistribution or tenure reform (Cousins, 2000; Hall and Williams, 
2003).  With this altered direction and the substitution of personnel which accompanied 
it, many former NGO activists and human rights lawyers, having worked in state 
employment, rejoined the NGO sector, attempting to contest the government’s new 
insistence on the private property model, and to reinstate the more egalitarian vision of 
land reform. Their efforts have been matched by those of the rank-and-file landless, as 
will be demonstrated below. 
 
Land and citizenship in South Africa are thus integrally linked, but the connection 
between them developed over time, and was contingent and changing. It was shaped in 
the course of intensive negotiations over several decades between those dispossessed of 
their land, the activists and lawyers aiming to reclaim it on their behalf, exiled members 
of the ANC (African National Congress), and – after 1994 – the new government which 
those exiles formed. Land continues to symbolize citizenship as well as being seen as a 
material outcome, intended if not yet achieved, of citizens’ exercise of their democratic 
rights: getting land back was one of the things ‘we voted for’.  But the exact mechanism 
of land access, and hence the precise way in which property is held, has been a matter of 
dispute. If one model of citizenship - increasingly favoured by the government - has 
come to foreground the private ownership of property, another - highlighted by activists 
and by members of the rank-and-file landless - has idealized land as an inalienable 
possession which ought not to be privately owned or sold.   
 
The first section of the paper illustrates these conflicting views about ownership, showing 
how these crystallize disputes over the nature of citizens’ entitlements: narrow, restricted 
and based on ‘property’, or broad, inclusive and based on universal access. 
 
‘All people have the right to stay’: titleholders and tenants  
 
Restitution  was at the outset the ideological and moral cornerstone of the land reform 
program overall. The drafters of the new constitution saw land as central in defining the 
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rights that had formerly been denied, and its restoration as a means to restore those rights 
and with them the sovereignty, nationhood and full citizenship of the African population.  
Seen against the broader backdrop of the reform process, however, restitution has an 
ambiguous status. It restores property to those black titleholders whose original ownership 
of it – in the early years of the 20th century - had assured them a better life, even after its 
confiscation (Murray, 1992), and thus is alleged by some to have been driven less by a 
desire for social justice and equality than by an urge to re-establish the status quo ante.  
Land purchase, as a strategy adopted by those who strove to better themselves despite the 
racially-based land alienation enshrined in the 1913 Land Act, had formed the basis of 
the emergence of a black middle class. The communities who have struggled for decades 
to get ‘their land back’ have particular interests not shared by those demanding land on 
other grounds. The narrow remit of restitution as it came to be practiced gave the lie to its 
symbolic potency. Given that it was primarily the claims of former black titleholders 
which were foregrounded by the government’s policy of restitution, the privileging of 
former ownership looked set to strengthen a longstanding social division in South African 
society by returning such properties to their former owners.   
 
Such a group were the SePedi-speaking Lutheran converts who in the early 20
th
 century 
had pooled their resources to buy the farm Doornkop, near Middelburg in Mpumalanga 
(B on map).  When, some time in mid-century, the most successful members of this 
titleholder group abandoned full-time farming, moved to urban areas such as Soweto, and 
took up professional positions as nurses, teachers and librarians, their land came to serve 
primarily as a residential and livelihood base for tenants from a landless ethnic group 
(SiNdebele-speakers), mostly people evicted from white-owned farms where they had 
worked and lived as labour tenants. Moving to farms such as Doornkop, they now 
became the rent-paying tenants of its – largely absentee – Pedi owners.  Both those few 
Pedi owner/landlords remaining on the farm, and their Ndebele tenants, were later evicted 
under the apartheid regime’s infamous ‘black spot’ removals of the 1970s, in a bid to 
expunge all black residents from so-called ‘white’ South Africa and resettle them in 
ethnically-distinct reserves or ‘homelands’. When, with the advent of democracy, the 
farm was restituted in 1994, many Pedi owners showed little interest in returning to take 
up their ownership rights. It was, instead, their former Ndebele tenants and their 
descendents, alongside a burgeoning population of landless people newly-evicted off 
white farms and thus more recently rendered ‘landless’, who began vociferously to 
demand the right to access land on farms such as Doornkop. Several hundred 
tenant/squatter families moved to the farm, building shacks there and starting to cultivate 
crops and vegetables. In doing so, they claim merely to have filled a vacuum, given that so 
few of the farm’s bona fide owners had shown willing to leave Soweto or their other places 
of domicile to return to the newly-restored farm.  But this did not make the owners, 






 Figure 1: Map of Mpumalanga  
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Their anti-tenant sentiments were of long standing.  Owners re-invoked the community’s 
original constitution, drawn up by some of their forefathers in 1933, which states that no-
one ‘who is not a legal purchaser of the farm’ or a descendant of one may ‘dwell or 
settle’ there.  The exclusivity in this injunction was linked to the sense of religious 
difference which had led Doornkop’s owners, like many similar mission/Christian 
communities, to buy their own land in the first place. What made this sense of exclusivity 
more stark in the case of Doornkop was that it echoed an ethnic cleavage, pitting SePedi-
speaking Christians with a modernizing tendency against SiNdebele tenants generally 
thought of as traditionalists who favoured the veneration of ancestors (Delius, 1989).  
Restored Pedi owners, in the 1990s, were however uneasily aware that their opposition to 
tenancy echoed the ethnic/racial exclusivities of South Africa's past. On one occasion well 
before the large-scale tenant invasion of 1999, several truckloads of Ndebeles arrived and 
were refused permission to settle on the farm. They retaliated by accusing the Doornkop 
community of ‘practising apartheid’.  It was also rumoured that the Mpumalanga housing 
director had refused to provide services to Doornkop until it abandoned its elitist stance as a 
Volkstaat (lit. ‘people's state’, an ironic reference to the separate homelands for Afrikaners 
once proposed by the far-right Conservative Party). But despite these anxieties, most 
titleholders remained steadfast in their opposition to accepting tenants. For them, restored 
citizenship went along with private ownership, rather than with free access to land. 
Not all Pedi owners agreed, however. Very few restored titleholders were resident on the 
farm: most were living in Soweto and other urban areas, had middle-class/urban sources 
of livelihood, and viewed the restored farm as a rural retreat for weekends. But some had 
fewer options for making a living outside the rural context, and had been actively 
involved in letting out – or ‘selling’- plots to the Ndebele outsiders. In the respective 
condemnations and justifications of this practice (and the renewal of tenancy which it 
enabled), the moral positions adopted have been closely linked to perceived material 
interests and have not always coincided with the owner/tenant division. The expressed 
views of the minority of rent-receiving owners echoed those of tenants: that land should 
be available to all rather than being privately owned, and hence that the basis for owner 
exclusivity was invalid, since this went against the promises of all-encompassing political 
belonging which had been made at the 1994 election. 
One owner in particular had been assaulted and (unsuccessfully) charged for ‘selling’ 
several hundred plots on the farm. He, and his client/tenants, justified the practice by 
stressing the need to use of land for the common good and de-emphasising its ‘private’ or 
exclusionary aspects. ‘All people have the right to stay’, said the land-seller, claiming to 
be motivated by charitable impulses as well as by egalitarian and anti-racist sentiments. 
‘As a black person I can't allow a fellow black to suffer, so I help them to come here’, he 
maintained. ‘The national government doesn't believe in keeping people separate, so why 
should we keep them separate here?’  
 
Asked to elaborate on the kind of land ownership which they saw as legitimate, new both 
tenant/squatters and their new landlord advocated a continuation of the model which – 
ironically - had formerly operated during the apartheid era, in the communally-held 
homeland areas.   
 9 
We want land to be under government control and that is where we want to stay.  If 
the place is under government, it can always assist us in times of need. …  I want 
the government to tell me:  ‘stay here, there is water, your house, your toilet’. 
This ‘communal/trusteeship’ model of ownership had been established only during the 
1930s and 1940s (Murray, 1992:132), but had become firmly entrenched as a ‘customary 
African’ practice by the time of writing.  
 
Figure 2: Doornkop squatter leader Jan Masina 
 
In disputes about who had the greatest entitlement to live on the farm - its absentee 
owners or the squatters with their immediate material needs - ideas of citizen entitlement 
interlocked with those of custom and culture. Invoking Lockean-style concepts about the 
necessity of using land rather than letting it go to waste, tenants saw it as unfair to allow 
one group of privileged people to own land of which they clearly had no need, while 
another group was being denied land despite being much better placed to use it for 
grazing and cultivation.   
 
It can be seen from this case how sectors of society beyond the official reach of 
restitution have latched onto the discourse which links citizenship to the restoration of 
land.  Many of the landless poor, with no basis for ‘restitution’ since they never before 
owned property in any legally enforceable sense, were nonetheless invoking its broader 
spirit by demanding the right to settle on black-owned farms. By connecting restitution to 
the rights of the citizen, they were challenging what they saw as the attempted 
reinstatement, by the official restitution programme, of pre-existing owner/tenant 
divisions. Members of each constituency – the title-holding Pedi newly restored to 
ownership of their farm and the tenant Ndebele who have flocked to live there - draw on 
repertoires envisioning contrasting views of citizenship.  One highlights the restored 
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ownership and exclusivity of private property while another foregrounds the equal rights 
of all. While both ideas are enshrined in the discourse of the South African post-apartheid 
state (informed by the struggle agenda of the liberation elite who struggled to establish 
that state), they here coexisted uneasily with the ideas about cultural/ethnic exclusivity 
that had been the bedrock of state ideology in its earlier, apartheid guise.  
 
Ethnicity, race and citizenship 
Forms of citizenship that are differentiated along ethnic lines are well known in the 
anthropological literature. In studies of the US, what has been of particular interest are 
the ethnic or racial differences distinguishing legal citizens from immigrants, which may 
mask – or parallel - socio-economic stratification. Membership of a single nation, 
according to Ong, is achievable for immigrants only along lines mediated by race: there 
are ‘black’ or ‘white’ routes to US citizenship respectively (1996).3 In a later work, Ong 
demonstrates that, instead of seeing everyone as striving to belong to a single nationality, 
there is now greater stress on the preservation and protection of minority rights. But 
liberal ideas on multiculturalism deny the ‘darker side’, in which the fruits of citizenship 
fully granted to some are effectively denied to others. Some are truly excluded, others 
simply given second class status while allowed into the body politic only in a restricted 
sense (Ong 2003). In similar vein, Rudrappa shows how NGOs help Indian immigrants to 
make their difference an advantage in their bid for inclusion in the body politic of the 
USA, by offering ‘ethnic routes to becoming American’ (2004). Privileging 
multiculturalism and respect for difference, these organisations turn race-based resistance 
into ethnic assimilation. Here, an initial uniformity of citizens’ rights and fulfilment of 
their needs by the state has given way to a new emphasis, in which the market is foremost 
and the demands of flexible accumulation allow for people to have particularities as 
groups and ‘rights to be recognized as different’ (2004). In both cases, multiculturalism, 
coupled with market discourse, can present a positive image that masks inequality and 
exclusion.  
 
But it is not only between those recognized as jural insiders and those seen as immigrants 
or outsiders that such differentiation occurs.
4
 The case of South African land reform – 
like that of Europe (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994) and Mexico (Lomnitz, 1999) - shows 
how insider/outsider divisions occur internally as well. Contested aspirations for full 
restored citizenship, expressed on one level in terms of divergent views about property, 
were here mediated through ethnic stereotypes, in terms of which the (mostly unwilling) 
Pedi landlords expressed their fundamental difference from their property-less Ndebele 
tenants. The ideological nation-building project has attempted to transcend such divisions 
and to downplay the socio-economic faultlines in society, informed by the ruling ANC’s 
                                                 
3
 Citizenship for incoming migrants from Asia was modeled on these existing racial axes 
of identity and belonging, established by slave ownership and its aftermath (Ong 1996). 
Cambodian immigrants were ‘blackened’ (assimilated as poor welfare-dependents) while 
wealthy businessmen from Hong Kong were ‘whitened’ (as wealthy entrepreneurial 
businessmen) (Ong, 1996; Ong, 2003). 
 
4
 South Africa has, in the post-apartheid period, experienced its own particularly violent 
xenophobia (Sichone 2006). 
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need - increasing exponentially as social differentiation grows (Adam et al, 1998; James, 
Ngonini and Nkadimeng, 2005; Marais, 2001) - to garner political support from poorer 
sectors of the electorate. The rift between the black middle class and the poor, albeit 
never as great as the more notorious racial divide between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’, has 
endured in one form or another.  Expressing itself in ethnic forms, this rift harks back to 
the cultural differentiations which were emphasized by the apartheid state.  
 
What is as noteworthy as the ethnicized character of multicultural citizenship in the US 
studies cited above, is the fact that citizenship rights under neoliberal conditions appear to 
be characteristic of a more atomized and individualized society, where market 
relationships predominate, inequality is on the increase, and attempts are made to 
inculcate responsible behaviour even among those sections of the population that may 
not, in the end, enjoy many of the fruits of that citizenship. While the Doornkop case 
illustrates how citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa initially seemed set to intensify 
the ethnic differentiations that the apartheid state had once enshrined in law, contesting 
statist discourses of egalitarian liberation, the next case demonstrates how the welfarist 
vision of citizenship as fulfilling needs and providing entitlements has been quickly 
superseded by market-oriented notions which posit the individual citizen as responsible 
for her own wellbeing and sustainable reproduction. In the process, new faultlines have 
become evident, sometimes partly replacing or at least cross-cutting the older ones. 
Racial discourses of whiteness/blackness have re-emerged as the means through which 
ideas of the responsible citizen are expressed.  
 
The reluctant farmers: cultural citizenship and contestation.  
 
Delivering on the promises of land reform was initially seen as one way of transcending 
ethnic/class divisions of the kind discussed above.  But delivery has been slow and has 
privileged particular sectors while neglecting others, thus deepening rifts and 
exacerbating conflicts rather than damping them down. Given these delays and inequities, 
other nation-building tactics have been substituted. On restituted lands such as that of 
Doornkop, state officials have responded to owner/tenant ethnic conflicts by trying to 
appease the tenants, while simultaneously shifting them off to neighbouring areas where 
they might enjoy their ‘own rights’ of ownership and citizenship. Faced with 
contestations over restitution, they turned instead to the redistribution wing of the 
programme to solve conflicts over land and citizenship.  In the case of Doornkop’s 
squatters, it was proposed to settle them on a nearby farm purchased for the purpose (I on 
map).  New, technical and intricately planned models of ownership and managerial 
competence emphasize that the onus is on the ‘beneficiaries’ of redistributive land 
reform, once they have become the proprietors of jointly-owned farms, to constitute 
themselves as members of Communal Property Associations (CPAs)
5
 or trusts, and hence 
to take responsibility for their own economic and social well being (James, 2007:154-76). 
                                                 
5
 A law passed in 1996 stipulated that every redistributed or restituted land must be 
governed by such an association,  must have a constitution, a system of governance such 
that individual members elect a committee, a means of transferring property upon the 
death of individual members, and the like. 
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The resettlement of the Doornkop tenants proposed for this ‘redistribution project’ had 
not been completed by the time of my fieldwork in 2003. But designers of this alternative 
strategy would have done well to take a lesson from an earlier-attempted programme of 
redistribution, situated nearby at Sizanani (II on map). This land reform initiative, with its 
communally-owned farm, was not faring as well as had been hoped and planned-for. 
Among other things, this was because it was modeled on an image of the self-disciplined 
citizen, independent of the state and of employers, forging her own way in the world, but 
in a setting where the circumstances were far from conducive to the achievement of such 
aspirations. 
 
The prevalence of neoliberal forces and market ideologies require that we go beyond the 
contextual aspect of citizenship, its modeling on prior forms of experience, and its ethnic 
differentiation, to explore the idea of ‘cultural citizenship’. Citizenship, shows Ong, can 
involve ‘the cultural inscription of state power’, through Foucauldian-style ‘self-making’. 
Cultural citizenship involves subtle pressures; such that people may feel themselves 
compelled to adjust to dominant modes of being (1996). This is a matter of citizenship 
rather than simply of belonging in a more general sense, in that much of this pressure 
concerns the earning of the right to be a participant in national life (Kymlicka and 
Norman 1994). A diffuse cultural discourse, experienced as hegemonic by poorer 
immigrants in the US, proposes citizenship as involving the civic duty of individuals to 
reduce their burden on society; if necessary to pull themselves up by their own 
bootstraps, entrepreneur-style, and attain success through self-reliant struggle. 
Succeeding in doing so would amount, in Ong’s terms, to becoming ‘whitened’; 
becoming a citizen in a more mainstream and less ethnically marginal sense. Few of 
those in her account - Khmer refugees from Cambodia - manage to achieve this particular 
kind of assimilation, however. Exceptionally, some Khmer women joined the Mormon 
church and/or married Mormons. By doing so, they were in effect becoming the go-
getting, hard-working Americans, not in receipt of welfare cheques, that neoliberal 
discourse favours. These few, then, managed to ‘whiten’ themselves whereas the majority 
remained crammed into a kind of pre-existing ‘black’ – almost second-class - citizenship 
mould.  
 
In South Africa, as in many settings in the global South, similar visions of citizen 
responsibility – labeled ‘responsibilization talk’ - have become ubiquitous (Chipkin, 
2003; Cornwall, Robins and von Lieres, 2011).  Rather than simply being evident in 
some generalized ‘cultural’ sense as in Ong’s work, such talk has been explicitly adopted 
in state policy documents and White Papers. These stress that citizenship should go 
beyond providing services such as housing and water to fulfil ‘basic needs’: it should 
entail ‘furnishing the conditions for individuals and households to sustain themselves 
socially and economically’. There is an injunction for people to ‘roll up sleeves’ to act in 
a concerted and responsible manner, rather than being the ‘consumers of municipal 
services’ (Chipkin, 2003:64-5). Analysing one such White Paper, Chipkin notes a switch 
from an emphasis on how many houses have been built, how many sites serviced (and, 
one might add, how much land redistributed), to one on sustainability, and on making 
people responsible for their own welfare.  
 
 13 
The advent of such talk, closely tied to technical and elaborate ‘development plans’, has 
been traced to a moment two years after the first democratic election of 1994. In 1996 the 
government’s initial RDP (Reconstruction and Development) strategy, focused on 
development in a more welfarist sense, was replaced by GEAR (Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution), more explicitly neoliberal in focus and aimed primarily at producing 
growth and stimulating foreign investment. Where the RDP embodied a conviction that 
the market was unable ‘to do anything other than reproduce existing racial inequalities’ 
(Chipkin, 2003:82), GEAR entailed the opposite. Combining the economic priority of 
growth with the political one of democracy, however, confronted the new government 
with sometimes irreconcilable objectives: to ensure a healthy economy attractive to 
private investors while retaining popular support from those with no assets who were 
increasingly sliding into unemployment and poverty (Hart, 2002: 61; Adam et al, 1998: 
190). The task has been made still more challenging, in that the older fault-lines have 
been transcended to produce newer, more extreme ones. Starker than the cleavage which 
separates the impoverished landless from the black title-holder class, as in Doornkop, is 
that which now divides it from the privileged ‘liberation aristocracy’. This, although 
partly drawn from the existing black middle class, has novel and distinct features and 
advantages. It is a new cadre of black business-oriented elites, assisted by policies of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), whose interests are closely entwined with those 
of the ruling ANC, upon which it is often dependent for the ubiquitous government 
‘tenders’ out of which it makes its living (Adam et al, 1998: 190; Freund, 2010: 21; 
McNeill, 2012). 
 
In my fieldwork setting, this type of cultural citizenship and the reciprocal interplay of 
rights and responsibilities came into focus most clearly at the point when restitutive 
models, focused on restoring that which had been lost in the past, had been found 
wanting, and when people were encouraged instead to take charge of their futures. 
Instead of having their rights of yore re-granted by the state, they were encouraged to 
become forward-looking, independently-motivated self-starters. Planned models of 
ownership and managerial competence emphasize that the onus is on land reform’s 
‘beneficiaries’, once they have become the proprietors of jointly-owned pieces of land 
purchased by means of state grants, to become the ‘new farmers’. Although these plans 
owe much to broader government policy, the character of neoliberal government is such 
that they are usually implemented by non-state bodies: there has been a switch from the 
state to ‘alternative service providers’ (Chipkin, 2003:67). In the case of the redistribution 
farm Sizanani, the training of the farm’s new owner-occupiers has been outsourced to the 
parastatal development agency Eskom, and in turn to black-owned companies of ‘service 
providers’ and/or private consultancies.  
 
The following conversation from my field notes shows how Eskom Development 
Foundation officer George, and Department of Land Affairs (DLA) officer Rose, in a 
visit to the farm, were attempting to actualize a vision of self-reliance and disciplined 
action. The objects of their ‘remaking’, however, remained caught in a web of 
dependency upon the state and upon their white farmer employers: a fact of which they 
were all too aware. 
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George (from Eskom Development Foundation): You no longer work at 
makgoweng (the place of the whites) - makgoweng is here, work is here. You are 
the farmers - you are your own bosses. Your children are your eyes and your ears, 
they must be involved. Do not come and tell us that your children are in town 
working. You must get here in time for meetings. This place belongs to you.  
Rose (from DLA) speaks, very emphatically. She talks about maize, poultry, cattle. 
Every so often she punctuates her words with the query ‘do you hear me?’ And 
people murmur obediently in affirmation.  
One of the ‘service providers’: The boer [white farmer] has now gone - we can no 
longer blame our failures on the boers. But you need training to do farming - 
running a farm is like driving a car. If you try to do it without training you will not 
manage to do it at all. … 
Female CPA member: What is the government going to do? When are they going 
to give us water, electricity, and so on? When is electricity going to be laid on here? 
George: These things will be settled by the service providers. … 
Some people get up and start to leave. Rose gets upset.  
Rose: We want to have a general meeting every month. … We would like to have 
the meeting on a week day – this will force people to attend and thus to stop their 
work on farms. If the meeting is on the weekend, people will just carry on working 
on farms during the week. People should not be working on farms here. You're your 
own bosses - you are like whites. 
Male CPA member: If you have it in the week, some will come, and those who are 
working will not.  
George: We could have it at 5 o'clock, or 6 o'clock, to accommodate them.  
They take a vote to hold it on a weekday afternoon.  
Male CPA member: (defiantly) I cannot make it in the week - I work on a farm.  
Everybody laughs. 
 
In the semi-humorous final statement by this male CPA member, it is evident that the 
intended beneficiaries - newly construed as ‘efficient small farmers’, almost ‘like whites’ 
in their self-sufficiency, by government and consultants alike - contest the ‘self-reliant’ 
vision of their future. This example shows the state - and its agents in the Eskom 
Development Foundation - attempting to foist the responsibilities of ownership onto 
beneficiaries. But this vision is frankly unrealistic, given the general lack of state support 
and state subsidies for farmers, big or small, from the early 1990s onwards are further 
factors underlining the implausibility of this idea (James, 2007:10, 231: 2012:20), and 
given the lack of experience of the people in question. The only literate person in the 
group is Driver Ntuli, the treasurer of the CPA, who is still a scholar.  
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Figure 3: Sizanani CPA treasurer Driver Ntuli 
 
While parastatal development agencies or ‘service providers’ try to reshape reality by 
portraying Sizanani’s members as independent owners responsible for their own future 
prosperity, the members themselves recognize that their poverty will continue to render 
them reliant on white farm employment and on state welfare. Overall, then, these 
members of the regional tenantry reject private ownership, harking back instead to 
models of landholding established before 1994 in which access to land was guaranteed 
either by the state, or by other, more powerful, patrons or intermediaries: usually 
combined with other wage-based forms of livelihood. In Ong’s terms (1996), they are 
mocking of, and resistant to, any attempt to ‘whiten’ them - or turn them into boers 
(Afrikaans farmers) - resolutely reaffirming the fact that whatever citizenship they have is 
mediated through their ‘blackness’: their existing identity as poor blacks working as wage 
labourers on neighbouring white farms – and still, to all intents and purposes, landless. 
This outsourced citizenship is thus evident more in its ‘deficit’ than its presence 





The anthropology of citizenship illuminates how the actions and experiences of people 
carry the imprint of presently existing and earlier understandings, discourses and 
expectations. They are both influenced by and resist these. The aspirations to restored 
citizenship enunciated in the ANC’s election campaign of 1994 were centred on a 
unifying idea about restitution. The squatter leader’s statement that the government ought 
                                                 
6
 For a similar insistence on retaining earlier, state-driven visions of development in the 
face of newer market-oriented ones, see Sharma (2008). 
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to own the land reflects one interpretation of this, harking back to forms of state 
ownership that prevailed from the 1950s to the 1990s in the former homelands: a model 
in which enjoyment of the benefits of citizenship were premised on state and chiefly 
patronage. The restored titleholders of Doornkop held, in the main, to an opposing view, 
one which privileged a return to the status quo ante and would bring them back, they 
hoped, to their earlier positions as property owners. Conflicts of this kind, mediated 
through the ethnic frameworks that the apartheid state had long legitimized, were 
transcended when newer divisions emerged. Members of the BEE elite to whom aspects 
of government and development were outsourced became the bearers of a new discourse, 
in which citizenship would need to be earned, not granted, and in which the image of the 
‘white farmer’ as opposed to the ‘black employee’ became the intended blueprint. It is 
unclear how far this new wave of black consultants actively espoused such ideas about 
the self-motivated farmer or, conversely, whether they simply subscribed to these 
because their own new forms of livelihood – and middle-class citizenship - depended on 
its legitimacy and on securing compliance from the rank-and-file landless at whom their 
speeches were aimed.  
 
Such a switch from entitlements and rights to the responsibilization of neoliberal 
citizenship echoes the themes outlined by Kymlicka and Norman (1994). It also dovetails 
with Ong’s analysis of cultural citizenship – ‘the cultural inscription of state power’ – 
which is underpinned by Foucauldian ideas of self-making (1996). Here, cultural, often 
barely perceptible, sub-currents become part of people’s internalized self-government. 
Taking a similar view of outsourced, capillary-like, non-state arrangements, but focusing 
more on institutional than on socio-cultural frameworks, is Ferguson and Gupta’s paper 
on ‘neoliberal governmentality’ (2002). But are such analyses, with their strongly 
Western-centred character, appropriate in an African setting?  
 
The term ‘neoliberal’ has been recently subjected to critical analysis, with attempts made 
to untangle its confusingly multiple meanings (Ferguson 2011; see also Kipnis 2007; 
Sanders 2008). First, says Ferguson, there is neoliberalism as ideology, viewed by 
Harvey as a disguise for self-interest (Ferguson, 2011:170). In South Africa, while 
neoliberalism as ideological doctrine became widespread, the actual extent and influence 
of market models was limited. A particularly strong version of state planning during the 
apartheid era – with state subsidies to farmers, marketing boards and the like - has left its 
imprint. The sudden withdrawal of these endowed the post-apartheid economy with a 
situation unconducive to the emergence of small-scale semi-formal entrepreneurs in 
general, and to that of small farmers in particular. Even if current state policy does 
attempt to adopt free-market ideology, this does not mean that market forces in fact 
predominate. The attempted privileging of the market as a harbinger of change was, 
indeed, made possible only through state-initiated planning and regulatory frameworks. It 
was these initiatives, in the form of ‘black economic empowerment’ (BEE), that made it 
possible for consultants, like the ones now attempting to train Sizanani’s farmers, to take 
up employment and to operate at least their businesses – if not those of the putative 
farmers they were encouraging - with some success.  
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A second aspect demonstrates that it is insufficient to characterize neoliberalism simply as 
the self-interested ideological project of a capitalist elite, as Harvey might have it. In South 
Africa, for political as well as historical reasons, and to mitigate increasingly intense 
inequalities, pensions, welfare and other state grants (such as those with which land for both 
restitution and redistribution was purchased) play a key role. These, and to a lesser extent 
wages, have blunted what might otherwise have been the sharp instrument of market-oriented 
targeting through which the ‘reluctant farmers’ of my story were being newly encouraged to 
‘self-make’. Overall, the existence of considerable – if not always effective – state spending 
means that South Africa does not, in fact, represent a classic case in which market models 
have free reign; the country, rather, is best characterized as possessing a ‘distributional’ 
rather than a ‘neo-liberal regime’ (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006:314). Or, as I have written 
elsewhere, ‘neoliberal means serve to ensure the ever wider spread of redistribution’ (James, 
2012:37). 
 
Beyond neoliberalism as ideology, Ferguson’s interest in the concept is, above all, for its 
use to characterize ‘specific governmental devices’ (Ferguson, 2011:182) and, by 
implication, citizenship. In this guise, he maintains that the term is least useful when 
applied in African settings where attempts at instigating techniques of self-control, 
encouraging people to become self-motivated, and the like have been ‘very limited’ 
(Ferguson, 2011:173). Other authors have similar misgivings about African as well as 
other postcolonial settings, but imply that Foucauldian approaches can be retained, 
provided they are combined with those focusing on other forms of citizenship regime. A 
tendency to comply, in part, with self-imposed disciplinary arrangements, while also 
resisting these, has been similarly noted by Ecks, in India. In the face of attempts at what 
might be considered the ultimate neoliberal regime – that of the ‘corporate citizenship’ 
which multinational drug companies attempt to impose – he shows how GPs in India 
attempt to apply its tenets, yet readily switch to ‘near’ rather than ‘neo-liberalism’ (Ecks 
2010).  
 
In similar vein, John Comaroff points to how attempts at ‘capillary power’ in (post) 
colonial states  
amounts to the exact opposite of what a Foucauldian narrative … might lead us to 
expect. That narrative does not … account for the essential paradox of colonial 
governance: its capacity to … elicit compliance and contestation, discipline and 
defiance, subjection and insurrection. … in ways that blurred the boundaries 
between these, apparently antithetical, species of action.” (1998: 340).7 
What such accounts suggest is that governmental arrangements in whatever period are 
not a matter of either rights or responsibilities; either enforced compliance or subtly 
insidious self-discipline. Instead, they are a matter of both/and:  
                                                 
7
 He cites Fred Cooper: ‘power in colonial societies was more arterial than capillary – 
concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond such domains, and in 
need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to place.’ (Cooper, 1994, 
cited in Comaroff, 1998).   
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at the very same time as they spoke of transforming colonised peoples into civilized 
… free, right-bearing citizens’, [they]… dealt in heterogeneity by naturalizing 
ethnic difference and essentialising racial inequality. (Comaroff, 1998:329)  
 
In sum, broad, over-arching political/economic projects of citizenship - whether in 
Western or postcolonial settings - should not be assumed to be hegemonic or determined. 
In considering how different regimes of citizenship interact, we must bear in mind how 
earlier social orders have left their imprint upon newer ones. We need a view of 
citizenship which merges elements - state and market - that might at first sight seem 
contradictory: one which both acknowledges the power of wider frameworks and 
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